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ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
1. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is reported as 
Bradford v. DeMita, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999); 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. 
STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH JURISDICTION OF 
SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion on December 16,1999. 
1. There have been no orders respecting either a rehearing or an extension of 
time in this matter. 
2. Since this Response is not a cross-petition, there is no reliance made on Rule 
47(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended). The writ of certiorari is sought in order to review 
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claims of the Petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married in June 1985, in Provo, Utah (Findings 
of Fact No. 1, p. 152, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 37). 
2. Effective July 14, 1998, the lower court found that the existence of 
irreconcilable differences between Mr. and Mrs. Bradford made the continuation of 
their marriage no longer possible (Findings of Fact No. 3, p. 152, Record). 
3. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford are 63 and 65 years old, respectively (Findings of Fact 
No. 6, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 89). 
4. While there were married, Mrs. Bradford possessed few assets other than 
some personal property and land in Indianola, Utah. After paying the debt on this land 
with money given to her by her husband, Mrs. Bradford eventually sold this land. She 
kept all of the profits herself (Findings of Fact No. 7, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 3-
4). 
5. During the marriage, Mrs. Bradford worked at temporary jobs. Because she 
has trouble focusing on her task and may have carpal tunnel syndrome, she is unable 
to work (Findings of Fact No. 10, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 90-92). 
6. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150.00 per month in child care for 
taking care of her granddaughter and $381.00 in Social Security, which amounts to 
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$531.00 in monthly income (Findings of Fact No. 11, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 
93). 
7. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford can be retained or develop new skills in order 
to substantially increase their income (Findings of Fact No. 12, p. 151, Record). 
8. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have lived in Mr. Bradford's home in Spanish Fork, 
Utah, since the beginning of their marriage. This home was paid for and then given to 
Mr. Bradford ar an inheritance gift before he married Mrs. Bradford. Mr. Bradford 
was born and raised in this house, and it has been passed from generation to generation 
within his family (Findings of Fact No. 13, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 34-35). 
9. Neither party disputes that the value of the home is $180,000.00 (Findings of 
Fact No. 17, p. 150 Record). 
10. Mr. Bradford deeded the home by way of warranty deed to he and Mrs. 
Bradford as "joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not at tenants in common: 
approximately four years after they had married (Findings of Fact No. 18, p. 150, 
Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 44). 
11. Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford in 1992. At that time, 
Mr. Bradford requested that both the home and other real property be awarded to him. 
The divorce action was dismissed in 1993 (Findings of Fact No. 19, p. 150, Record) 
(3/4/98 Tr. at 55). 
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12. Since 1992, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have had many arguments, and Mr. 
Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. Bradford on many occasions (Findings of Fact 
No. 20, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55). 
13. James DeMita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been living with Mr. and 
Mrs. Bradford since 1995. Mr. DeMita's son also stays at the home from time to time. 
In exchange for these living arrangements, Mr. DeMita neither pays rent nor the utility 
bill and resides in the home rent-free (Findings of Fact No. 21, p. 150, Record). 
14. Mr. DeMita attended one year of law school and has since worked at 
various jobs. At the time of the trial, Mr. DeMita was employed on a part-time basis 
at a computer store. His 1996 gross income was approximately $3,500.00 (Findings 
of Fact No. 22, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 106-08). 
15. In July 1996, Mr. Bradford discovered various engineers in his home when 
he entered his house. Although the reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. 
Bradford are in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the project's development. This 
argument was more severe man the others, and divorce was again discussed (Findings 
of Fact No. 24, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 38-40). 
16. On August 8,1996, Mrs. Bradford deeded her share of the home by way of 
quit claim deed to her son James DeMita. Mr. DeMita gave his mother $10.00 for the 
transaction (Findings of Fact No. 25, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 4-10). 
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17. Ten Dollars ($10.00) is not the equivalent value of one-half of the house and 
property (Findings of Fact No. 26, p. 149, Record). 
18. Because Mr. DeMita is Mrs. Bradford's son, the quit-claim transfer of her 
property to his name was made to an "insider," according to Utah Law (Findings of 
Fact No. 27, p. 149, Record). 
19. Although she deeded her portion of the property to Mr. DeMita rather than 
any of her other children, Mrs. Bradford claimed that the transfer was made for estate 
planning purposes. At trial, however, she acknowledged that she did not prepare a will 
nor did she prepare any instructions whatsoever regarding the disposition of the 
property (Findings of Fact No. 28, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 10-14). 
20. After this transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. DeMita continued to live in the 
home as they had before (Findings of Fact No. 29, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 12-
14). 
21. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. DeMita ever told Mr. Bradford about the 
quit-claim transfer. Mr. Bradford discovered the existence of the deed when his 
daughter went to the recorder's office to verify that the home and property had been 
re-zoned for development as Mr. DeMita had mentioned. At this time, the daughter 
discovered the quit-claim deed and that the property had actually never been re-zoned 
(Findings of Fact No. 30, p.149-49, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 14,42,45). 
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22. After discovering this information, Mr. Bradford commenced another 
divorce action against his wife. The time between the granting of the deed and the 
filing of divorce was approximately 11 months (Findings of Fact No. 31, p. 148, 
Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 46). 
23. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home to her son left her in 
possession of only her personal property, which was limited value. Thus, this transfer 
constituted substantially all of her assets (Findings of Fact No. 32, p. 148, Record). 
24. When asked on cross-examination whether she could afford to pay Mr. 
Bradford for one-half of the property's value, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she would 
not be able to do so, but that she would have to rely on family members if she were 
obligated to pay such a sum (Findings of Fact No. 33, p. 148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 
101-02). 
25. At the time of the transfer of the quit-claim deed, Mrs. Bradford should have 
reasonably believed that Mr. Bradford might seek to divorce her, and that he would 
probably claim the home and property as his own as he had done so in the previous 
1992 divorce action (Findings of Fact No. 34, p. 148, Record). 
26. The house and property are not partitionable, as they contain a residence, 
road and river frontage. If an interest were conveyed, the house would have to be 
refinanced or sold (Findings of Fact No. 35, p. 148, Record). 
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27. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's name on the deed to the 
house in 1992, the trial court found that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford 
since he inherited this from his father before he married Mrs. Bradford. This finding is 
consistent with previous Utah Supreme Court decisions wherein the parties married 
later in life, and one of the parties had brought into the marriage an inheritance gift 
which was subsequently deeded to the other party. See Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 
P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) (Findings of 
Fact No. 36, p. 148, Record). 
28. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income, but she cannot make 
up for this shortfall. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600.00 per month after 
expenses. Therefore, Mr. Bradford is required to pay Mrs. Bradford $600.00 per 
month in alimony for a term not to exceed the length of the marriage. This gives 
$1,131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses and leaves $1,058.00 for Mr. 
Bradford's expenses (Findings of Fact No. 40, p. 147, Record). 
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The Utah Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court correctly ruled that 
Mrs. Bradford was a "creditor" of Mr. Bradford, is not only a correct ruling based on 
the facts of this case, but is consistent with Utah statutory authority. 
The past disposition of this case by both the trial and appellate courts can be 
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characterized thus: When this issue was litigated during divorce proceedings, the trial 
court determined that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5, plaintiff 
was a creditor of defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, set aside the transfer, and 
held that plaintiff was a creditor with a claim. Indeed, since this very issue is in 
question here, the Court of Appeal's language is quoted in its entirety: 
A "creditor," according to section 25-6-2(4), "means a 
person who has a claim." A "'claim' means a right to payment, 
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Utah Code 
Ann. §25-6-2(3) (1998); see also Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 
206, 48 P.2d 513, 516 (1935) (holding persons having tort claim 
against grantor that was not reduced to judgment at time of 
conveyance are "creditors"). 
Although no Utah cases directly address whether a husband 
or wife becomes a creditor of his or her spouse when 
contemplating divorce, the Oregon Supreme Court's statement on 
the subject is helpful to our analysis: 
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Ore. 385, 388-89,15 P. 650, 3 
Am. St. Rep. 162 (1887), we held that a person in the position of 
plaintiff may maintain a suit to set aside a transaction which may 
defeat her recovery and rights in a contemplated suit [**8] for 
divorce. This rule prevails in other jurisdictions that have 
considered the matter. 
We conclude, as did the trial court, that the conveyance by 
deed of April 14,1972, was obtained by fraud to hinder or prevent 
plaintiffs recovery of [defendant's] equitable interest in the 
fourplex, in the divorce suit, and is therefore set aside and held to 
be void. 
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Adamson v. Adamson, 273 Ore. 382,541 P.2d 460,466 (Or. 1975) 
(citations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court determined that "pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5 Mr. Bradford is a creditor of 
Mrs. Bradford in that he has a claim to the real property which 
Mrs. Bradford deeded to her son, Mr. DeMita." The trial court 
based this conclusion on the fact that Mr. Bradford had threatened 
divorce just weeks before Mrs. Bradford made the transfer. That 
conclusion is consistent with the Oregon Supreme Court's analysis 
in Adamson, which we adopt. In our view, the trial court correctly 
concluded Mr. Bradford was, indeed, a creditor of Mrs. Bradford, 
given that his claim to the house—although not reduced to judgment 
in a divorce proceeding-had arisen through recent threats of [**9] 
divorce. We note this conclusion is consistent with our supreme 
court's admonition to construe the statute liberally "to reach all 
artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and 
effect." Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244,1260 (Utah 1987); see 
also Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,291, 351 P.2d 959, 962 
(1960) ('"All statutes made against fraud should be liberally and 
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud.'") (quoting Twyne's 
Case, 16 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)). 
Bradford v. DeMita, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999) 384 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. 
Appellee can offer little more guidance than that issued by the above-mentioned 
holding. The Court of Appeals issued its ruling in light of case law that admonishes 
courts to be wary of a debtor's activity that could be deemed as fraudulent vis-a-vis a 
creditor. This admonition was heeded when the Court went to the very language of the 
act - finding that future threats of divorce, especially in hght of the facts at hand (a 
particularly contentious marriage with numerous talks about separation) - indicated that 
9 
Mr. Bradford was a creditor with a claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of both the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court below it 
represent clear applications of statutory construction, reliance on appropriate precedent, 
and the overall charge to read the UFCA in a way that will protect individuals just like 
Mr. Bradford, a man whose family home was titled away from him, without notice, 
only after Mrs. Bradford realized that she might very well lose an interest in the home 
altogether. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this iHi^ day of April, 2000. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS R. PATTON 
Attorney for Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this /% -^day of April, 2000, two 
copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
following: 
James DeMita 
Appellant 
1138 East 100 North 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 47(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. §25-6-2(4) and §25-6-5 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended) 
11 
823 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Ru le 49 
may petition separately, or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related 
questions, it will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of 
certiorari covering all the cases A cross petition for writ of 
certiorari shall not be joined with any other filing 
(b) Parties All parties to the proceeding in the Court of 
Appeals shall be deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless 
the petitioner notifies the Clerk of the Supreme Court in 
writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the parties 
below have no interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of 
such notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding 
below, and a party noted as no longer interested may remain 
a party by notifying the clerk, with service on the other 
parties, tha t the party has an interest in the petition 
(c) Motion foi ceitification and transmission of record A 
party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing 
the petition or at any time pnor to action by the Supreme 
Court on the petition, may file a motion for an order to have 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the tna l court 
certify the record, or any part of it, and provide for its 
transmission to the Supreme Court Motions to certify the 
record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme Court 
should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to the 
Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the 
brief in opposition and such understanding cannot be derived 
from the contents of the petition or the brief in opposition, 
including the appendix If a motion is appropriate, it shall be 
made to the Supreme Coui t after the filing of a petition but 
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition In the 
case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, such a motion may be made before the filing of the 
petition Thereafter, the Clerk of the Supreme Court or any 
party to the case may request that additional parts of the 
record be certified and transmitted to the Supreme Court 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(a) Timeliness of petition A petition for a writ of certiorari 
must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 
days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of 
Appeals The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the 
petition 
(b) Refusal of petition The clerk will refuse to receive any 
petition for a writ of certiorari which is beyond the time 
indicated in paragraph (a) of this rule or which is not accom-
panied by the docket fee 
(c) Effect of petition for rehearing The time for filing a 
petition for a w n t of certiorari runs from the date the decision 
is entered by the Court of Appeals, not from the date of the 
issuance of the remittitur If a petition for rehearing is timely 
filed by any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of 
certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of 
rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent decision entered 
upon the rehearing 
(d) Time for cross petition 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
(A) within the time provided in Subdivisions (a) and (c) of 
this rule, or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari 
(2) Any cross-petition timel} only pursuant to paragraph 
(d)(lXB) of this rule will not be granted unless a timely 
petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is 
granted 
(3) The docket fee shall be paid at the time of filing the 
cross petition The cleik shall refuse an> cross petition not 
accompanied by the docket fee 
(4) A cross petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined 
with any other filing The clerk of the court shall refuse any 
filing so joined 
(e) Extension of time The Supreme Court, upon a shovwng 
of excusable neglect or good cause may extend the time foi 
filing a petition or a cross petition for a writ of certiorari upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by paragraph (a) or (c) of this rule, whichever 
is applicable Any such motion which is filed before expiration 
of the prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme 
Court otherwise requires Notice of any such motion which is 
filed after expiration of the presenbed time shall be given to 
the other parties No extension shall exceed 30 days past the 
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later 
(f) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the 
same as provided in Rule 26 
Rule 49. Pet i t ion for writ of certiorari. 
(a) Contents The petition for a writ of certiorari shall 
contain, in the order indicated 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose 
judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all 
parties 
(2) A table of contents with page references 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged 
and with parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, s tatutes , 
and authorities cited, with references to the pages of the 
petition where they are cited 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the 
terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary 
detail The statement of the questions should be short and 
concise and should not be argumentative or repetitious Gen-
eral conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court of Appeals 
is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable The 
statement of a question presented \v ill be deemed to comprise 
every subsidiary question fairly included therein Only the 
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included therein 
will be considered by the Supreme Court 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any 
opinions issued by the Court of Appeals 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court is invoked, showing 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be 
reviewed, 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing 
and the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an 
extension of time within which to petition for certiorari, 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross-petition for a 
writ of certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition 
for a writ of certiorari in connection with which the cross-
petition is filed, and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, s tatutes, ordi-
nances, and regulations set forth verbatim with the appropn 
ate citation If the controlling provisions involved are lengthy, 
their citation alone will suffice and their pertinent text shall 
be set forth in the appendix referred to in subparagraph (10) of 
this paragraph 
(8) A statement of the case The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of the 
proceedings, and its disposition in the lower courts There 
shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported b> citations to the 
record before and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
r jxtwju 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, othei 
than a person who holds the securities 
(1) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre 
tionary power to vote the securities, or 
(n) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote, 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand 
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities 
(1) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities, or 
(n) solely to secuie a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote, 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, 01 a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor, or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not 
include 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid hen, 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt 
under nonbankruptcy law, or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by 
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not 
the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim 
(7) "Insider" includes 
(a) if the debtor is an individual 
(I) a relative of the debtor or of a general 
par tner of the debtor, 
(n) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner, 
(m) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7Xa)(n), 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a 
director, officer, or person in control, or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager, 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation 
(I) a director of the debtor, 
(n) an officer of the debtor, 
(in) a person in control of the debtor, 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner, 
(v) a general partner m a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv), 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager, or 
(vn) a relative of a general partner director, 
officer, or person in control of the debtor, 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership 
(I) a general partner m the debtor, 
(n) a relative of a general partner in, a general 
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor, 
(m) another partnership in which the debtor is 
a general partner, 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scnbed in Subsection (7)(c)(in), 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtoi is a member or manager, or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor, 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company 
d) a member or manager of the debtor, 
(n) anothei limited liability company in which 
the debtor is a member or manager, 
(in) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner, 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(d)(in), 
(v) a pei son in control of the debtor, or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, 
manager or person in contiol of the debtor, 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the 
affiliate were the debtor, and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an 
obligation, and includes a secunty interest created by 
agieement, a judicial hen obtained by legal or equitable 
process or proceedings, a common-law hen, or a statutory 
hen 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited 
liability company, corporation, association, organization, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, busi-
ness trust , estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial 
entity 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the sub-
ject of ownership 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual 
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the 
third degree as determined by the common law, or a 
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive rela-
tionship within the third degree 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an 
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and 
creation of a lien or other encumbrance 
(13) "Valid hen" means a hen that is effective against 
the holder of a judicial hen subsequently obtained by legal 
or equitable process or proceedings 1992 
25-6-3. Insolvency. 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is 
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the 
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, 
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the 
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner 's 
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership 
debts 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property tha t 
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hinder delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred 
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to 
the extent it is secured by a valid hen on property of the debtor 
not included as an asset 1988 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer oi an obligation if, in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred 
or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied However, value 
does not include an unperformed promise made other than m 
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(3) 30 district judges in the Third District, 
(4) 12 district judges in the Fourth District, 
(5) four district judges in the Fifth District, 
(6) two district judges in the Sixth District, 
(7) three district judges in the Seventh District, and 
(8) two distnctjudges in the Eighth District 1998 
78-1*2.3 N u m b e r of j u v e n i l e j u d g e s and j u r i s d i c t i o n s . 
The number of juvenile court judges shall be 
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District, 
(2) five juvenile judges in the Second Juvenile District, 
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District, 
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District, 
(5) two juvenile judges in the Fifth Juvenile District, 
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District, 
(7) two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile Dis-
trict, and 
(8) one juvenile judge in the Eighth Juvenile District 
1999 
78-1*2.4,78-1-3. Repea l ed . 199c 
Section 
78-2^1 
78-2^1 5, 
78 2*2 
78-2*3 
78-2-4 
78-2-5 
78-2-6 
78-2-7 
78-2-7 5 
CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Number of justices — Tbi ms — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and func-
tions 
78-2-16 Repealed 
Supreme Court jurisdiction 
Repealed 
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law 
Repealed 
Appellate court administrator 
Repealed 
Service of sheriff to court 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed 
78-2-1. N u m b e r of j u s t i c e s — Terms — Chief jus t i ce 
a n d a s soc i a t e chief j u s t i ce — Selection and 
func t ions . 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years The chief justice may serve successive terms The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning fiom the Supreme Court The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in tha t office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law 
(6) There is cieated the office of associate chief justice The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms The associate chief justice shall be 
elected b> a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shaJJ be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law 1990 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. R e p e a l e d . 1971,1981 
78-2-2 S u p r e m e C o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decreeb or in aid of its jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with 
(I) the Public Service Commission, 
(n) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees, 
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer, or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e), 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a s tatute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony, 
d) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony, 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction, and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests, 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers, 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas, and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
